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THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY BANKING
ANTHONY GAETA, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the 2015 UNC School of Law Center for Banking and Finance
Banking Institute (“Institute”), I was asked to share some of my
observations and insights as to the future of community banking in North
Carolina.1 Having represented community banks since 1974, primarily
in North Carolina as well as other southeastern states, and having
participated in the latest boom of de novo community banks in North
Carolina that began in the mid-1990s, I based my observations at the
Institute on my past experiences and I attempted to look into the future.
It is apparent that my conclusion, which I repeat below, caused some
amount of disagreement.
In my conclusion, I stated that “so alas, I see the demise and
eventual extinguishment of true small town community banks.” I also
said that “I hoped I was wrong, as I have been wrong often in the past.”2
The purpose of this Article is to give further thought to the
conclusions I expressed at the Institute. In summary, the factors I
considered were:
1. Since the early 1990s until 2009 there were a total of
77 community banks whose deposits were insured by the
FDIC newly chartered in North Carolina by the North
Carolina Commissioner of Banks.3 I am aware of at least
one additional community bank charter issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); namely, Alamance
* Anthony Gaeta, Jr., retired, formerly “of Counsel” to Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP
(Raleigh, North Carolina); B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D. William & Mary Law School.
1. Anthony Gaeta, Jr., The Center for Banking and Finance Leadership Award Address
at the University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Banking and Finance’s Annual
Banking Institute (Mar. 26, 2015) (transcript on file with author).
2. Id.
3. E-mail from Rowe Campbell, Chief Deputy Commissioner of Banks, N.C. Office of
the Commissioner of Banks, to author (Jan. 12, 2016, 10:53 EST) [hereinafter Campbell Email] (on file with author).
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National Bank, Graham, North Carolina, which
subsequently converted from a national charter to a North
Carolina charter.4
2. The last community bank chartered in North Carolina
was Coastal Bank & Trust, Jacksonville, North Carolina.
The date of that charter was April 13, 2009.5
3. There have been no banks chartered in North Carolina
since the Coastal Bank & Trust charter, and I am unaware
of any proposals to charter a new bank in the last six to
seven years.
4. Since the early 1990s, the number of banks
headquartered in North Carolina has fallen from 186 in
1992 to 65 as of September 30, 2015.6 This drop in the
number of banks headquartered in North Carolina is a
result of 106 mergers and 7 bank failures.7
II. NORTH CAROLINA COMMUNITY BANK CONSOLIDATION AND THE
STARTUP DROUGHT
Accordingly, an obvious observation is that the supply of newlychartered banks has come to an absolute halt while the number of
community banks in existence has dwindled precipitously. It is true that
we have had cycles like this in the past and, in time, new banks were
formed in communities where a community bank had been taken over in
a merger by a larger competitor. Most of the time, those mergers resulted
in a premium to the existing community bank shareholders and many
communities saw the community bank cycle of formation, growth, sale,
and another new bank formed to fill the community bank void. I can
4. United Financial, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Nov. 24, 2004).
5. N.C. COMM’R OF BANKS, NC State Charter Banks and Trust Companies,

https://www.nccob.org/Online/brts/BanksAndTrusts.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
Although three other banks have received charters since 2009, they were not startup de novo
banks. E-mail from Ray Grace, N.C. Commissioner of Banks, to author (Jan. 11, 2016, 14:39
EST) (on file with author).
6. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Institution Directory: North Carolina,
https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp.
7. Campbell E-mail, supra note 3.
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name communities in North Carolina, such as Wilmington, Monroe,
Dunn, Asheville, Raleigh, Charlotte and Rocky Mount, as just a few
where this occurred.
In the past, numerous consolidators were anxious to bid for the
loans and deposits of successful community banks. Banks throughout
North Carolina participated in expansion through acquisition of
community banks. These banks included Peoples Bank and Planters
National Bank in Rocky Mount, Branch Banking and Trust Company
(“BB&T”) in Wilson, First Citizens Bank in Raleigh, Southern National
Bank in Lumberton, United Carolina Bancshares in Whiteville, Central
Carolina Bank in Durham, Triangle Bank in Raleigh, not to mention the
healthy appetite of some of the larger banks such as NationsBank (then
NCNB and now Bank of America), Wachovia (now Wells Fargo),
Northwestern Bank (now Wells Fargo), and First Union National Bank
(now Wells Fargo). In short, in the past there were such a large number
of “consolidators” that the popular phrase from the movie “Field of
Dreams” rang true: “If you build it, they will come.”8
Today, however, many of those consolidators either have been
consolidated themselves or have become so large, as in the case of Bank
of America, Wells Fargo, BB&T and First Citizens, that the acquisition
of a smaller community bank is either not worth the time and expense to
consummate such a small transaction or the community bank is in a locale
already served by the expanded banking footprint of the potential
consolidator. Consequently, we now have less of a competitive
environment to acquire community banks.
Lesser demand is
accompanied by a lower value attached to those banks. This is simple
investment banking economics. There are simply not as many buyers in
the marketplace. With fewer buyers, the certainty of the end game or
“liquidity event” at a handsome or even a reasonable profit, which was
always anticipated by investors in a startup community bank, is lessened.
Consequently, community bank startup organizers are finding it much
more difficult to attract the local investors needed to support a de novo
bank than they had in the past. In short, the lack of willing buyers at a
premium price means a community bank is just not an attractive
investment, limiting the investment capital available for a de novo
community bank.

8. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
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III. COMMUNITY BANK PROFITABILITY: COMPLIANCE COSTS AND
MARGIN COMPRESSION
This lack of investment interest is also negatively impacted by the
regulatory burden imposed on all banks in the wake of the financial crisis
that commenced in 2008.9 While it is true that many of the Dodd-Frank
regulatory restrictions only impact banks with more than $10 billion in
assets, these regulations have trickled down to the smaller community
banks as “best practices.” The result is material expense items not seen
before the 2008 financial crisis. Outsourcing much of this regulatory
burden is expensive and self-staffing by the community banks is even
more impractical from an expense standpoint. Add to this the heightened
scrutiny banks face from the federal banking regulators and the increase
in consumer protection regulation mandated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and many community bankers I have spoken to feel
that they are being hit by a tsunami of over-reaction and over-protection.
Community bankers, in the wake of the financial crisis that I
daresay they had very little to do with, are pleading with their
Congressional delegations for some regulatory relief to ease the financial
burdens and cost of compliance being placed upon them.10 But the reality
is that coming up with an alternative to a “one size fits all” regulatory
oversight structure that protects the banking public no matter the size of
bank they choose to bank with is proving to be a difficult task.
Adding to this expense burden is the lessened profitability of
many community banks due to the historically low interest rate
environment.11 Community banks largely make their profit on the spread
between interest charged on loans and interest paid on deposits. Very
few have been successful in developing sources of income from non-

9. See Jeff Bater, Dallas Fed Report Warns of Compliance Costs on Community Banks,
[2016] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 2 (Jan. 5, 2016) (citing a report by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas warning that “more banks may become too small to succeed” due to the
increased regulatory burden stemming from the Dodd-Frank Act).
10. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Bankers Assoc., the Credit Union Nat’l Assoc., the
Indep. Cmty. Bankers Assoc., and the Nat’l Assoc. of Fed. Credit Unions to Richard Shelby,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Dev., Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member,
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Dev., and Members of the S. Banking Comm. (May
15, 2015), http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ltr051515.pdf.
11. See generally Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Opening Statement at Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Press Conference (Dec. 16, 2015) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/ files/FOMCpresconf20151216.pdf).
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interest activities. Margin compression is faced by all community banks;
lack of loan demand for many banks aggravates the issue. Simply stated,
community banks are not as profitable today as many were in the past.
Until interest rates return to more normal levels and until economic
growth returns with qualified borrowers in need of loans to support their
growth and expansion, community banks will continue to be challenged.
With net income flagging, premiums paid on the sale of the bank
will be adversely impacted as will stock price if the bank is publicly
traded. Lagging stock prices make investors impatient, and impatient
investors put pressure on boards of directors to consider “alternative
strategic options”—code for “consider selling the bank!” All of this
comes down, in my mind, to make attracting investors a significant
challenge for any de novo bank.
IV. LOCAL INVESTMENT: ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY HEADWINDS
I have often stated that the startup of a de novo bank is like
constructing a three-legged stool. The first leg of the stool requires
competent executive management. In the current environment, I see
sufficient strength in this category to support the formation of a de novo
community bank. The second leg of the stool is a viable economic
community where local investors will show their support by investing in
and doing business with the de novo bank. My opinion is that there are
fewer of those communities in existence now than prior to the crisis,
which has taken its toll so that the local economy in many communities
is simply not strong enough to support a de novo community bank. The
third leg of the stool is the interest of community members in investing
in and supporting a startup community bank. In my opinion, this leg is
the weakest of the three. The vast majority of investment in the
community banks that required recapitalization since the financial crisis
has come from private equity funds, not from local communities. The
lone exception is the First Carolina State Bank, Rocky Mount, North
Carolina, where a recapitalization took place with all investment coming
from the local community.12 I know of no other successful communitybased bank recapitalization in North Carolina.

12. Lee Weisbecker, BioSignia Exec Raises $13M to Help Fund Bank Acquisition,
TRIANGLE
BUS.
J.:
TRIANGLE
BIZBLOG
(Aug.
14,
2012),
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/blog/2012/08/biosignia-exec-raises-13m-to-help.html.
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While private equity is available to invest, private equity is not
the way to start a bank. Banking regulators want to see broad-based
community support, assuming that investors will bring some, if not all,
of their banking business to their new community bank. Quite often, a
heightened community pride arises and local business and civic leaders
provide business and investment to make the new bank a reality. Private
equity can only supply capital and not deposit or loan business. Further,
because of the financial crisis, regulators will require far more start-up
capital for a de novo bank than they required prior to the economic
downturn. In a larger city, often the capital required for a new bank prerecession was in the $15 million range. Today, I have been told by
reliable sources at the bank regulatory level that such a minimum would
now be closer to $25 million. Clearly, raising that much additional capital
is a hurdle organizing groups who may currently be thinking of starting a
bank must consider.
V. CONCLUSION
This leads me to the conclusion that, for the foreseeable future,
and until the economy returns with robust growth, we will not see any de
novo banks, we will continue to see consolidation of those community
banks started since the 1990s, and the interest in investing in community
banks will continue to wane, making the growth of community banks
difficult indeed. Without capital accumulation, be it through enhanced
profitability or capital investment by willing investors, community banks
will find it hard to thrive and possibly even survive; their only recourse
may be to sell to a larger competitor at a reasonable price for their
investors. My prediction is that many communities that once welcomed
and supported community banks will continue to decline and the true
community bank serving local community businesses and local citizens
will slowly become a relic of the past.
I hope I am wrong . . . I have often been in the past!

